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Summary  findings
Evaluating the restructuring of large enterprises in  The evidence also suggests that mass privatization did
transition economies is difficult because it is only one of  not result in weak corporate governance because it was
many economic changes. Such evaluation is nevertheless  followed by a rapid consolidation of ownership.
essential for designing reform policies.  Their findings support the view that the main objective
Djankov and Pohl examine 21 case studies of Slovak  of privatization programs should be the speedy
firms based on detailed financial information for 1991-  transformation  of ownership, not the selection of perfect
96, and interviews with top management. Much of their  owners.
sample was firms initially classified as "nonviable  Slovakia was an interesting choice for case-study
lossmakers." They found that the majority of large  analysis because much of the heavy industry and arms
Slovak firms successfully  restructured without the help of  industry of former Czechoslovakia was located in
foreign investors or government restructuring programs.  Slovakia, so it inherited a relatively unattractive
Privatization to insiders, through management-  industrial structure. Slovakia also implemented two very
employee buyouts, did not hamper restructuring because  different privatization programs, one of mass
the new owners (old managers) invested heavily in new  privatization and one of leveraged management buyouts
technology, laid off a substantial part of the workforce,  or direct sales to (domestic) outside investors.
sought foreign partnerships,  and were prepared to sell
controlling stakes to outsiders in return for fresh
financial resources.
This paper - a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Europe and  Central Asia Technical
Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the determinants of enterprise restructuring in transition
economies. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please
contact Faten Hatab, room H8-087, telephone 202-473 -5 83  5, fax 202-477-8 772, Internet address fhatab@worldbank.org.
April 1997. (28 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work  in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the  series  is to  get the  findings  out quickly,  even  if the  presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of  the  authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those of  the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of  the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they represent.





World Bank. The opinions  expressed do not necessarily  represent  those of the World Bank.  We would like to
thank  Jozef Petras from the Slovak  Ministry  of Economy  for help with data and company  visits and Magdi Amin,
Robert  E. Anderson,  Wendy  Carlin, Lubomir  Lizal, Roberto  Rocha, Petr Zenker, and seminar  participants  at the
World  Bank for suggestions. For comments,  please  contact:  Tel: (202)  473-4748, Fax: (202) 477-8772,
EM: sdjankov@worldbank.org.IRestructuring  of Large Firms  in Slovakia
I.  Introduction
The restructuring  of large enterprises  has received much attention in the transition of centrally-
planned economies  to market economies. The need to transform  these enterprises  into viable firms is
widely acknowledged. The extent of such restructuring  and the determinants  that underlie a successful
transformation  are less studied. Various  schemes  for dealing  with large enterprises  have been tried. The
effect of such programs  is hard to measure  since  the restructuring of enterprises  (or the lack thereof)  has
taken place in the context of significant  changes  in the overall economic  environment. Notwithstanding
the difficulty  in such measurement,  a proper  evaluation  is crucial for designing  further  reform  policies.
This paper extends the literature on the microeconomics of transition by re-examining the
stylized facts about firm restructuring in the light of new empirical evidence. The study is based on
twenty-one  case studies of Slovak firms and uses detailed financial  information  for the 1991-96  period
and interviews with top management.  A large part of our sample represents firms that were initially
classified as  "non-viable loss-makers."  We show that  the majority of  large Slovak firms  have
successfully  restructured  in the absence  of foreign investors  and government-led  restructuring  programs.
The study also throws some new queries on the effectiveness  of different privatization  methods in
enhancing  corporate  governance  and improving  access  to skills and capital.
We find that privatization  to insiders through management-employee  buy-outs did not hamper
firm restructuring as the new owners (old managers) invested heavily in new technology, laid off
substantial part of their workforce, sought foreign partnerships,  and were prepared to sell controlling
stakes to outsiders in return for fresh financial resources.  The evidence also suggests that the mass
privatization  program did not result in weak corporate governance since it was followed by a rapid
consolidation  of ownership.  Our findings support the view that the main objective of privatization
programs  should  be the speedy  transformation  of ownership,  not the selection  of perfect  owners.
2Why use case studies rather than analyze larger sets of firms? Our earlier studies (Pohl et al.,
1996;  Claessens  et al., 1997)  use financial data for the 500-1,000  largest manufacturing  firms in several
transition economies  to study the restructuring  process. Such analysis  presents, however, only a partial
picture. Many variables  used to uncover  patterns  of adjustment  are not part of standard  financial  reports -
-e.g., data on firm input  and output  prices, managerial  profiles,  ownership  changes,  foreign  partnerships,
quality  control. They  are nevertheless  essential  in understanding  the causes for firm restructuring  and can
only be obtained  in enterprise  visits.
Slovakia  is particularly  interesting  for a number  of reasons.  A large part of the heavy and arms
industries  of former  Czechoslovakia  was located  in Slovakia  and it thus inherited  a relatively unattractive
industrial  structure. Slovakia  also implemented  two very different  privatization  programs. It participated
in the first wave of mass-privatization  and privatized the remainder of the firms through leveraged
management  buy-outs  or direct sales to (domestic)  outside  investors.
The paper is organized  as follows. Section  II compares  the speed  of restructuring  of large Slovak
fimns with similar samples from other transition economies.  Section III describes the data and the
methodology  of collecting  it. Section  IV reports changes  in the ownership  structure  of the firms. Section
V documents some of the common restructuring paths observed during company visits.  Section VI
evaluates  the differences  in firm  performance  and their likely determinants. Section  VII concludes.
II.  Restructuring of Industrial Firms in Transition Economies
Different approaches to restructuring have been extensively debated by policy makers,  foreign
advisors  and  academics.  However,  it  is  often  not  clear  what  is  meant  by  "restructuring."  Does
restructuring  refer to a single  firm or the entire economy? How is restructuring  different from the normal
process of growth and change? How does one measure  restructuring? At the plant level?  Economy-
wide?
3Restructuring is probably best understood as the transition process from a highly distorted
economy with many loss-making  firms to a "normal" market economy in which the overwhelming
majority of firms are profitable. Evidence  from the transition economies shows that the speed of the
restructuring process varies greatly across countries (Figure 1).  Firms in the countries with rapid
adjustment,  the Czech Republic,  Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia  have reached total factor productivity
(TFP)  growth  rates equal to those in the fastest  growing  economies.  I  Bulgarian  and Romanian  firms, on
the other hand,  experienced a relative decline in productivity. 2 What explains these differences in
performance?
Figure  1: Average  Restructuring  Indicators  1992-95
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Germanv  and Japan experienced  4-5% TFP growth  in the 1950s.  and Japan  sustained  this level through  the
1960s  (Wolff, 1996);  South  Korea  experienced  a 4.8% TFP growth in 1971-1981,  Taiwan  and Hong Kong -
4.3% in 1966-1976  (Young, 1995).
2  The methodology  used in calculating  the restructuring  indicators  in Claessens  et al., (1997)  is identical  to the
measures  described  in Section  V and  the Appendix  to this paper. This allows  a direct  comparison  of the
prefornance  of the fmns in our sample  and the whole  manufacturing  sector in Slovakia. Figure 1  is based  on
the manufacturing  censuses  and covers  48%, 64%,  44%,  42%, 92%,  93%,  91% of 1992  manufacturing
employment  in each (alphabetically  listed)  country.
4Various aspects of enterprise reform can be  identified: managerial autonomy, competition,
privatization,  concentrated  ownership,  hard bank lending,  and financial discipline,  including  bankruptcy
and liquidation. The relative importance  of each these factors in enhancing  enterprise restructuring is
unknown. This is for a number of reasons. To begin with, the variation  in performance  among  firms in
any one transition economy is much greater than that in market economies (see Pohl et al. (1996)),
making  it more  difficult  to explain  individual  enterprise  restructuring. This is likely becauserestructuring
is influenced  by not  just one, but a large  number  of factors,  each of which  contributes  an essential,  but often
statistically  marginal  aspect  to enterprise  reform. Previous  studies find that most variables  explain little of
relative enterprise performance within a country (once one controls for just a few, basic variables).
While the contribution  of particular  reforms  to enterprise  restructuring  is hard to identify,  it is clear from
the experience  to date that a comprehensive  policy reform package is needed. The degree of enterprise
restructuring  can be taken as an indicator  of the overall  strength  of a reform  package.
Empirical  studies on firm behavior  in transition economies  agree on three broad determinants  of
the speed and depth of restructuring:  a firm's initial conditions  ("inheritance"),  enterprise-specific  factors
(corporate governance, managerial ability), and the external environment (macroeconomic  stability,
import  competition,  financial  discipline,  the bargaining  power of labor unions). Initial conditions  include
sector of activity (Estrin  et al., 1995),  the pre-transition  level of productivity  (Estrin and Takla, 1995),
firm size (Pinto et al., 1993),  and the inherited  debt burden. Firm-specific  factors include  the structure  of
property  rights, 3 especially  the extent of progress  towards full privatization  (Estrin, 1994),  the presence
and type of outside owners  (Claessens  et al., 1996),  the ability (and willingness)  of managers to attract
foreign  partners,  and more generally  to ensure access  to better technology,  intermediate  inputs and capital
goods.
3  For a theoretical  discussion  of the effects  of different  privatization  methods  on firm  restructuring,  see Aghion
and  Blanchard  (1996),  Blanchard  (1996),  and  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1994).
5The role of the external environment has been extensively studied in cross-country comparisons
of transition economies' growth performance (Sachs, 1996).  Fast liberalization,  for example, has been
shown to lead to productivity growth (World Development Report 1996 and Gelb et al., 1996).  Financial
discipline  imposed by  external parties  is an essential  part of this  external  environment: when  no  one
financing losses, firms have no choice but to eliminate losses by increasing productivity.4 There is less
agreement on the privatization method that leads to the most effective corporate governance and can be
implemented over a significant share of a country's  industrial enterprises.
Previous studies (Caves, 1990; Carlin et al., 1995) have argued that the primary rationale behind
privatization is to create owners who have the power and incentives to monitor managers and ensure that
they  act  in the firm's  best  interest.  Each  approach to  privatization, however,  may  lead to  different
results.  Table  1  illustrates  the  existing  hypotheses  on  the  trade-offs  among  the  three  prevalent
privatization methods.  While management-employee buy-outs (MEBOs) and mass privatization lead to
speedy transformation of ownership, they are inferior (or questionable at best) to direct  sales to outside
owners  in  ensuring  effective  corporate  governance  and  better  access to  skills  and  capital.  This  is
particularly the case if firms are sold to foreign owners who  (as the argument often goes)  are able to
implement deep restructuring.
It should  be noted that important  relationships  exist  between  micro  factors  (initial  conditions  and internal
factors)  and  the external  environment.  The influence  of external  discipline,  for example,  depends  on
managerial  expectations  regarding  how binding  (credible)  these are. Thus  a belief  that governments  will bail
out loss-making  finns affects  enterprise  restructuring.  A number  of studies  have examined  these  relationships,
e.g., Pinto et al., (1993)  and Claessens  and Peters,  (1997).
6Table 1:  Tradeoffs  among  privatization  methods
| Better  Corporate Speed  and  Better  Access  to  I More  Government  |  Greater
Method  Governance  Feasibility  Skills  and_Capital I  Revenue  Fairness
Sale  to Outsiders  +  -+  + 
MEBO  |  +
Mass  Privatization  ?  +  v
Source:  World  Development  Report, 1996
The comparisons in Table 1 were based on conceptual, not empirical analysis.  The main
reason was the limited  evidence. The different  privatization  methods  were also country-specific. Thus,
for example, the Czech Republic opted for mass privatization, Hungary went primarily for sales to
foreign  investors,  while MEBOs  were wide-spread  in Poland. This made studies  on the effectiveness  of
privatization  methods difficult (if not impossible)  since one could not control for the impact of the
overall economic  environment. In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness  of different privatization
methods in fostering  firm restructuring  in the light of  new evidence  from Slovak firms' case studies.
Slovakia provides the best natural experiment among all transition economies since it is the only
country which has adopted all three privatization  methods  over a large number of former state-owned
firms.
III.  The Data
The evidence  presented here builds on a series of visits to large Slovak enterprises undertaken
by the authors in December, 1996.  By that time all the initial macroeconomic  shocks  were over and
the economy had  registered high aggregate growth in  two consecutive years  5.  The twenty-one
enterprises  we visited  were scattered  throughout  Central and Western Slovakia  and displayed  significant
diversity in sector origin and ownership  structure.
For  further  analysis  of  the Slovak  stabilization  and  mass  privatization  programs  see  Shafik  (1995).
7The selection  was done on the basis of several criteria.  First, all enterprises  were state-owned
in 1991 and were listed among the largest 200 Slovak manufacturing  enterprises  (the average size was
over 2,000 workers in 1991).  Second,  we mostly selected enterprises which had difficulties  in the
early transition  period. Such enterprises  were followed  by the Slovak  Ministry of the Economy  starting
in  1992.  In 1993, the Ministry commissioned  major consulting firms to  study twenty-seven  large
firms.  A detailed  report with recommendations  for further restructuring  steps was issued in each case.
Based on the reports, firms were classified in three categories (Table 2): non-viable loss makers
(category NL), potentially  viable loss makers (category  VL), viable profit makers (category VP).  We
revisited seven firms in category NL,  nine firms in category VL, and two firms in category VP
included in the original survey.  Three other firms had become part of holding companies  by 1996.
We visited the respective  holding companies and obtained information  on the individual  firms which
participated in the original survey, as well as the other firms in the holdings.  Six firms from the
Ministry list remained outside the scope of this study.  Their exclusion was dictated solely by time-
constraints.6
The case studies provide both quantitative  and qualitative  evidence. Balance  sheet and income
statement data were  obtained for  1991-96.  The interviews with managers and  owners contain
information  on production and marketing strategy, firm-specific  input and output prices, technology
acquisition,  sale/disposal of social and dubious assets, labor shedding, wage policies and severance
packages,  cooperation  with foreign firms, financing, and export performance.  The interviews  followed
a structured  questionnaire  (available  from the authors). A presentation  on the history of the enterprise
preceded each interview. Since  the industrial  conglomerates  were broken down in 1990, we followed
6  Those  are Hydrostav  Bratislava,  Kinex  Bytca,  Vihorlat  Snina,  VSS  Kosice,  ZSNP  Ziar  nad  Hronom,  and  ZTS
Dubnica  nad  Vahom.
8Table 2: Privatization
Case Category  Sector  Year  Ownership
1  NL  car components  1992  31% individual  owners;  32% investment  funds; 34% NPF;
3% Restitution  Fund
1995  consolidation  of ownership  to larger investment  funds
2  VP  paints  1992  25% individual  owners;  75% Investment  funds
(VUB;  Harvard  Capital;  SG Warburg,  etc.)
1995  consolidation  of ownership  to VUB and SG Warburg
(together  own 82%)
3  NL  electrical  engines  1995  97  % management  buy-out  (top five  managers);  3 % Restitution  Fund
4  VL  steel  tire cords  1996  100%  local strategic  investor,  unsuccessful  bid by management
5  VL  military  trucks  1996  100%  local strategic  investor,  unsuccessful  bid by management
6  NL  skid steer loaders  1996  80% local strategic  investors  including  VUB  bank, 20 % NPF
7  VL  rubber and fertilizers  1996  67% local strategic  investors,  unsuccessful  bid by management
8  VL  steel; cement  1992  75% management  buy-out,  25% major  creditors
(VUB,  Investicni,  CSOB)  acquired  significant  stakes in 16
mass-privatized  manufacturing  firms
9  NL  army uniforms  100% state ownership,  offered  to management  in 1996  but still in
negotiations
10  VL  rubber floors  1993  67% management  buy-out;  33% NPF
1996  33% General  Director,  67% management  buy-out
11  VL  overhead  projectors  1996  100%  local strategic  investor,  no management  participation
12  VL  bread and pastries  1996  100%  local strategic  investor,  no management  participation
13  VL  rolling  bearings  1992  77% management-employee  buy-out,  20% NPF, 3% Restitution  Fund
acquired  significant  stakes  in ten mass-privatized  manufacturing
firms
14  VL  industrial  chemicals  1992  100%  management  buy-out
15  VP  glassfiber  felts and  1995  67% management-employee  buy-out;  30% NPF; 3  % Restitution  Fund
fabrics
16  VL  technical  glass  1995  75% management-employee  buy-out;  22% NPF; 3% Restitution  Fund
17  VP  petrochemicals  1992  20% individual  investors;  80% NPF
1995  25% EBRD  and Bank  of New York, 20% individual  investors;
55% NPF
1996  39% management,  25% EBRD  and Bank of New  York, 20% individual
investors;  16% NPF
18  NL  military  trucks  1992  100%  local strategic  investor;  management  bid unsuccessful
19  VL  freight  wagons  1995  100%  local strategic  investor,  no management  participation
20  VL  paper and cellulose  1992  100%  management  buy-out  acquired  significant  stakes  in 30
mass-privatized  manufacturing  firms
21  NL  military  trucks  I  100%  state ownership
9the same firms (organizational  structures)  in our 1991-96  sample.7 The obtained  price data allowed us
to calculate  input and output price indices  at the firm level.  Those were used in the analysis  in the next
sections.8
The interviews  covered  eighteen  manufacturing  firms and three former trading companies. The
trading companies  had turned into private holding  companies  in 1992 and had managed  to buy majority
stakes in most of the companies  whose  products they had marketed including  some of the firms on the
Ministry list.  The interviews  with their managers contained information  on both the parent holding
company  and its subsidiaries. While the statistical  analysis  in the next section is based on the overall
financial performance of the holding companies, most restructuring measures (improving quality
standards, new product  lines, foreign  partnerships)  are traced back to their subsidiaries.
The case study method normally has significant  downsides.  Most important is the lack of
representativeness  of case study findings, i.e., their performance may not be indicative of economy-
wide trends.  Fortunately,  we have comprehensive  data on all large industrial  firms in Slovakia  and can
therefore link the smaller sample of case studies to the broader trends in the manufacturing  sector (see
Figure 1 above). Another potential  problem is the subjective  narrative of managers/owners  regarding
the causes of (and constraints to) restructuring.  We have, however, only used the interviews to
complement  our analysis  of the financial  performance  of firms in getting a better understanding  of the
many elements  of a successful  restructuring  strategy.
7  In two  cases,  firms  were  still  undergoing  a split-up  of the  former  conglomerate  in 1991.  Since  both  firms  were
independent  plants  (located  away  from  other  plants  in  the conglomerate  and  with  their  own  general  managers)
even  before  the  split-up,  we  obtained  financial  and  other  (including  employment)  data  from  their  managers
pertaining  to their  respective  plants  only.  For  further  analysis  of the  impact  of conglomerate  split-ups  on
restructuring  in Czechoslovakia,  see  Lizal  et al.,  (1996).
8  The  possibility  of obtaining  firm-specific  price  data  is one  of the  main merits  of the  case study  methodology.
10IV.  Privatization
The privatization  program in Slovakia went in two steps.  Approximately  600 Slovak firms
were privatized in  1992 through the first Czechoslovak voucher scheme.  A  second wave was
scheduled  for late 1994 but abandoned  at the last moment.  In 1995, direct sales became the dominant
mode of privatization. The process continued  in 1996 and by the end of the year an estimated  92% of
all Slovak manufacturing  firms were privatized  (Interview, 1996).
Three firms in our sample were directly included in the voucher scheme (Table 2).  The
ownership  pattern of these firms changed substantially  in 1993-96. In two cases the largest investment
funds had bought out individual  investors and smaller investment  funds.  In another case the voucher
privatization was followed by  a  partial privatization to  foreign investors followed in  turn  by  a
management  buy-out which resulted  in majority  inside  ownership.
The consolidation  of ownership  of  mass privatized  firms was especially  strong in the backward
integration  of the former foreign trade companies. Such consolidation  was possible through purchases
of shares of mass-privatized  firms on the secondary markets and through direct purchases of shares
from individual  citizens.  The three holding  companies  in our sample  became  significant  owners in some
of the firms in their respective  industries. One of them, for example,  acquired significant  stakes in ten
firms producing rolling bearings and domestic appliances  (Figure 2, ownership shares shown in the
boxes).
The findings from firms which either participated  in the mass privatization  program or bought
out firms on the secondary  market show that mass privatization  did not result in dispersed ownership.
These case studies are suggestive  of a broader trend noted in other studies.  Further analysis by the
authors indicates  that the concentration  of ownership among the universe of mass-privatized  firms in
Slovakia (all firms listed on the Bratislava Stock Exchange (RM-System))  increased by 50% during
1993-95. The former foreign trade companies  played a significant  part in this consolidation  process -
11the twelve holding companies represented on the list of top  100 largest Slovak companies owned
significant  stakes in 146 manufacturing  firms (Trend, 1996).
Figure  2: Ownership  Concentration  after  Mass Privatization
Omnia  Romo-Omnia  Danubla
Omnia  Roll  Domotechnika  Omnia  Odbyt  wholesale  of  Invest  export  of  Omnia  Bmo
export and Import  wholesale of  Domestic retail of  refrigerators  and  doIestic  exports  to Czech
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All direct sales were done through auctions.  The National Property Fund (NPF) favored
bidders with developed long-term  strategies (Interview, 1996).  In eight cases management  won over
outside bidders while in four cases management  lost.  Frequently, management  did not participate in
the bidding process but was consulted by all bidding parties.  Direct sales were highly leveraged
(Figure 3).  The new owners were required to put a  (at most) 10% downpayment  on the book value of
the company. The rest would be paid in equal installments  over a period of two to seven years.  The
resources of the privatized firm (retained earnings or debt) could also be used to finance subsequent
12payments.  In some cases, the NPF retained residual ownership, but it was always smaller than the
minimum  (a third of all shares) required for a blocking  vote.
Figure  3: A Direct  Sale  (Case  15)
8  managers  employees
67%  33%
sales  Holding  Company
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Table 2 shows the absence of foreign owners.  This is not surprising since the privatization
mechanism  in Slovakia  favored local investors. In nine of the direct-sale  firms, however, negotiations
were  underway  for  the  establishment of  joint  ventures  (in  most  cases  building  on  existing
subcontracting arrangements).  In  three  cases  (all management buy-outs), foreign partners had
expressed interest in buying majority stakes while keeping current management on board.  Those
transactions  (called  the "third wave of privatization' by managers)  were in their preliminary stages at
the time of the visits (December  1996).
Two trends emerge from the descriptive  analysis  of ownership  changes. First, we find that new
insider  owners were prepared  to sell controlling  stakes to foreign investors in return for fresh financial
resources.  Second, the evidence suggests that  mass privatization  did not result in weak corporate
governance  since it was followed  by a rapid consolidation  of ownership.
13V.  Dimensions  of Restructuring
The twenty-one  enterprise  visits reveal a bewildering  array of restructuring  paths.  Much of the
variation  can be explained  by differences  in initial conditions  and managerial  motivation. In this section
we document some of the common restructuring  characteristics. While some of the actions are already
catalogued in previous studies, others, like subcontracting  arrangements  and joint ventures, are new
developments. Quite interestingly,  the restructuring process was not led by new managers.  To the
contrary,  most pre-1991  managers  were (after several  years of absence)  reinstituted  as general managers
by 1996.
Management Turnover
In  1991-92  the general managers of 20 of the visited firms were replaced by the Ministry.
Those were mostly engineers who had gained their positions in the 1980s  but were, of course, party
members and were therefore replaced for political reasons.  Many firms saw several subsequent
management  teams in the pre-privatization  period.  By 1996, however, in nineteen  of the visited firms
the top management  team was again the pre-1992 team.  These  managers  were either reinstituted  by the
Ministry, by the new owners,  or came back as owners. The typical general manager had worked in the
enterprise for an average of 17 years before he was rehired in his current position  and knew the firm's
operations in depth. 9  In seven cases, general managers had started work in the company after high
school as  workers, and  had  obtained a  managerial position after  finishing (evening) university
education. These profiles  suggest  that firm restructuring  was not due to the entry of new, better-skilled
managers.
9  In one  case  the  general  manager  had  spent  37  years  with  the  company.  He  knew  the  names  of  all his  2,000
employees  and the age of every machine  in all five plants.
14Labor Restructuring
Restructuring  is most likely to be reflected  in labor shedding  in the first years of transition. An
enterprise can reduce its variable costs relatively fast by engaging in downsizing.  Previous studies
(Carlin et al., 1995; Claessens  et al.,  1997)  found that labor reduction in Slovak manufacturing  firms
was significant  (Figure 1) due to the absence of strong labor unions and the rapid expansion of the
service sector. The evidence  here supports  those findings. On average enterprises  cut their labor force
almost in half (Table 3).  In several firms employment  was reduced to a third of the 1991 level.  It is
interesting  to note that profitable  firms also made very large reductions  in the labor force.
The rubber floor producer (Case 10) was the leader in labor shedding.  Management  laid off
three-fourths  of the labor force and concentrated  in the production of seven profitable lines (22 lines
were operated in 1991). A number of workers were sent to foreign partner firms to study the use of
new labor saving technology.  The new quality control system eliminated  a fifteen-member  quality
team. Similarly, the introduction  of computerized  accounting system eliminated the need for eight
accountants. The contracting  out of the cafeteria  resulted  in further cuts of forty jobs.
While the magnitude of employment reduction seems staggering, it  is not unprecedented.
Similar labor cuts were reported prior to the privatization  of several large British companies  in 1981-
86.  British  Steel, for example, reduced  its labor force  by half while keeping  revenues  constant. British
Airways  reduced its labor force by 40% while  expanding  the number of flights. Those were, however,
selected companies in an otherwise stable economy.  The results in Table 3 are surprising because
many Slovak  companies  simultaneously  laid off half of their labor force.
15Table 3: Labor  Restructuring
Labor  Shedding  (Number  of Workers)  Average Nominal Monthly  Wage  (in current SK)
Case  Sector  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  % change*  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  %
change
I  car components  1,547  1,314  1,428  835  773  646  -58.2  4,87  5,645  6,612  6,875  6,841  7,181  47%
2  paints  838  808  779  803  798  767  -8.5  4,87  5,742  8,163  9,244  10,756  11,165  129%
3  electrical  engines  770  712  654  531  437  301  -70.9  3,11  3,435  3,767  3,895  4,167  4,326  39%
4  steel tire cords  3,145  2,663  2,478  2,062  1,754  1,432  -54.5  4,21  4,604  5,792  7,001  8,567  8,917  112%
5  military  trucks  1,419  1,171  981  912  734  641  -54.8  2,67  2,972  3,876  4,354  4,587  4,981  86%
6  skid  steer loaders  529  505  560  440  361  440  -16.8  3,42  3,718  4,861  4,675  4,981  5,118  49%
7  rubber  and fertilizers  7,140  6,354  5,614  4,100  3,354  2,817  -60.5  4,12  4,413  5,627  6,186  6,583  7,021  71%
8  steel; cement  356  340  312  281  247  220  -38.2  4,56  5,118  6,214  6,765  7,217  7,865  72%
9  army  uniforms  1,112  786  718  627  513  364  -67.3  2,85  3,007  3,694  3,965  4,017  4,265  49%
10  rubber  floors  1,410  1,222  811  601  456  370  -73.8  5,07  5,863  7,314  8,433  8,964  9,457  86%
11  overhead  projectors  592  533  489  448  428  382  -35.5  4,46  4,789  5,897  6,165  6,435  6,587  48%
12  bread  and pastries  451  417  342  331  317  306  -32.2  3,58  3,838  4,562  4,783  4,968  5,348  49%
13  rolling  bearings  405  298  273  254  233  217  -46.4  4,01  4,261  5,381  5,673  6,723  7,003  74%
14  industrial  chemicals  436  389  315  241  212  177  -59.4  4,36  4,498  5,119  5,476  5,797  6,235  43%
15  glassfiber  felts and fabrics  2,280  2,110  1,874  1,653  1,453  1,300  -43.0  4,41  4,671  6,237  7,285  9,119  10,080  129%
16  technical  glass  827  629  582  539  517  493  -40.4  4,23  4,681  4,582  6,034  6,483  7,928  86%
17  petrochemicals  7,462  7,053  5,921  5,309  5,276  4,986  -33.2  5,33  6,351  7,813  10,442  12,247  12,871  141%
18  military  trucks  4,100  3,700  3,300  2,800  2,100  1,754  -57.2  2,45  2,546  3,375  3,915  4,337  4,984  103%
19  freight  wagons  3,461  3,048  2,673  2,273  2,149  2,017  -41.7  4,65  5,091  6,483  7,361  8,462  9,784  110%
20  paper and cellulose  445  411  361  302  234  212  -52.4  5,21  5,924  7,157  8,339  9,856  10,893  109%
21  military  trucks  6,300  6,172  5,983  5,633  4,773  4,213  -33.1  5,12  5,458  6,126  6,432  6,761  6,872  34%
Average manufacturing  2,144  1,935  1,736  1,475  1,291  1,145  -46.2  4,19  4,602  5,669  6,301  6,994  7,518  78%
*  Change  in 1991-96. Since  we follow  the same  plant/firm  for the whole  period, the numbers  reflect  only labor  shedding,  not employment  reduction  resulting  from split-
ups from former conglomerates  or spin-offs  of smaller  units.
16None of the managers  met significant  opposition  to labor shedding. In Bratislava, for example,
voluntary departures were often the rule as workers could find better paying jobs in the emerging
private sector. Mass lay-offs  were implemented  in only three firms (cases 3, 7, and 9) where managers
did not see prospects for future demand increases.  In such cases, workers received a compensation
package of six months  pay (available  in monthly installments)  if they left at once, or a two months pay
if the legal advance notice (three months) was observed.  Virtually all employees opted for immediate
departure.
The reduction  in labor force was reinforced  by a freeze in real wage increases (Table 3).  The
average wage conceals, however, a wide dispersion. One reason for such dispersion  was the absence
of industry-wide  collective  bargaining agreements. Another possibility  may be profit-sharing  in firms
where employees helped managers in  acquiring majority stake.  A rise in  real wages was seen,
however, in fimns  privatized  through all three privatization  methods. On average, workers in the more
successful firms (irrespective of privatization technique) captured a  larger part of the productivity
differential. Real  wages in unprofitable  firms were 40% lower than in profitable firms in the same
sector (and requiring the same  skills).
Spinning-Off Social and Surplus  Assets
All enterprises sold their housing to employees  or transferred it to the municipality. In most
cases the recreational facilities  and cafeterias were also sold or the service was contracted  out. Only
one firm (case 6) failed to sell its social assets (hotel and garages). Management  attributed this to the
location of the facilities.  They were within a mile from the main production complex and six miles
from the nearest town. Two firms purposefully  kept some social assets: in both cases management  had
decided  that the offer prices were low and had temporarily  leased  them in expectation  of better deals.
When the industrial conglomerates  were broken down, many finms inherited large surplus
assets on their balance sheets including  unsold inventories from canceled orders, spare parts formachinery  already out of use, material inputs, machinery  and equipment  no longer used.  Disposing  of
such assets was difficult  given their limited alternative  uses. Their presence distorted the balance sheet
of firms.  Foreign partners frequently required managers to dispose of such assets before signing a
contract. The reason lay in the difficulty  of measuring  performance  in a plant which had inherited such
assets.  Although the market for dubious assets was small, the majority of firms managed to sell or
scrap all their surplus assets.  The buyers were usually small private firms.  Several firms also sold
machinery and materials to Ukrainian partners.  Only four firms (cases 3, 5,  9, 21) still retained a
significant  share of their surplus  assets  by 1996.
FYnding New Markets
In  1991,  46% of all output (on average) was sold on the Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA)  markets, 45% was sold in Czechoslovakia,  and 9% in Western Europe or other
markets. By 1996, only 15% of revenues  came from the former CMEA  markets while  47% came from
rest of world (RoW). The reorientation  was made possible for several reasons.  First, some firms had
already entered export markets  by 1991 and worked to expand  them in the following  years.  Second, a
large part of the expansion  came in the form of subcontracting  with Western European  (mostly  German
and Austrian) firms (Table 4). Third, many of the former trading companies remained  in business as
holding companies  and acted as marketing  departments  of all firms under their ownership. Lastly, and
contrary to expectations,  demand in the Czech Republic remained  stable after the Czecho-Slovak  split-
up in  1992.  This was due to the preferential trading and payments agreements between the two
countries.
Subcontracting  had additional beneficial effects. The contractors often required that Slovak
firms buy quality control systems  and recommended  appropriate  technology  and suppliers. On several
occasions  they trained Slovak workers in using it.  While essential for the survival of several firms in
the sample, subcontracting  was fragile and could  move eastward  once labor costs in Slovakia  increased.
18Managers were, however, confident that the obtained knowledge would help them penetrate new
markets  even if they lost their contracts.
New Products
The reorientation of  product markets and the dependence on  subcontracting  arrangements
brought significant  changes  in the product mix of most firms.  Only a handful of firms maintained  their
product lines close to their 1991 mix.  As stated earlier, these firms had substantial presence on
Western European markets prior to 1991.  In contrast, Firm  11 abandoned its old production lines
almost completely  (Table  4).  On average, 35% of all lines  were introduced  after 1991.
The introduction  of product lines was possible through new investments  in equipment (Table
4).10 Since most of the investment  was done after privatization  had taken place, one explanation  may
be the creation  of clear property  rights. A second  explanation  is the development  of private and foreign
banks. The large inherited  debt burden of some firms made it impossible  for them to acquire new loans
from domestic banks. In several cases, however,  management was able to  raise capital for new
investment  projects from foreign and private domestic banks (Bank Austria, Tatrabanka, Istrobanka,
ING Bank) particularly if they were supported  by foreign partners' guarantees.  Lastly, most firms
obtained  international  total quality assurance  (ISO 9001) certifications  (Table 6).  In addition, the two
chemical  firms recently  received  an ISO 14001
Only  one  firm  (Case  17)  reported  new  investment  in the 1991-92  period.
19Table 4: Export Performance and Foreign Partners
Case  Investment  Investment  New  ISO  Export  Share of  Export Share of  Subcontracts  Foreign Partners
to Value  to Value  product  9001  Revenues 191*  Revenues  1996*  1996*w*
Added  Added  lines *
(1993-94)  (1995-96)
(%)  (%)
CMEA  ROW  CMEA  ROW  (%)
1  11  32  35  1994  40  0  0  35  80  Volkswagen,  Opel, Daewoo,  Volvo,  Audi
2  32  58  30  1995  30  2  0  25  40  Bayer, Hoechst, Shell
3  5  9  40  no  25  0  0  45  52  Austrian  and German  partners
4  21  16  25  1995  15  5  0  40  25  Pirelli
5  17  19  40  1996  70  11  0  90  90  Caterpillar,  Hatlapa  (Germany),  Matorella
6  24  40  30  1995  40  0  45  0  0  Chinese  partners
7  0  15  35  1996  65  3  20  52  30  Pirelli, Uniroyal
8  11  30  40  1995  70  30  40  60  40  German  and Russian  partners
9  0  0  15  no  80  0  0  95  95  Belgian  and Dutch army  suppliers
10  0  42  30  1994  65  6  51  23  10  Conti, Pirelli
11  3  21  80  no  45  0  5  80  80  Austrian and German  wholesalers
12  16  22  20  no  0  0  0  0  0  services  local market  only
13  14  25  40  1995  82  18  22  78  60  AEG, Samsung,  Honda, Aldi
14  21  25  30  1995  60  10  20  48  27  Austrian and German  partners
15  23  31  10  1995  0  87  10  80  0  exports under  own trademark
16  17  22  50  no  40  0  20  25  20  Philips, Austrian  partners
17  17  31  25  1994  30  0  10  35  0  exports under  own trademark
18  23  51  60  1996  60  10  25  55  30  Canon  Enginering,  Mahindra&Mahindra
19  12  23  35  1995  60  5  15  80  26  Krupp, Thrall-Chicago
20  9  16  20  1995  45  5  15  50  23  Motorola, German  partners
21  0  0  45  no  60  7  10  30  30  Lombardini,  Indian  and Syrian  partners
Average  16  24  35  47  9  15  49  36
*  The residual  share of revenues  comes  from the Czech  and Slovak  markets.  **  Product  lines that were established  after 1991.  Does not include
product  lines  that had been  in operation  prior to 1991  but were upgraded  *** Revenue  from subcontracting  arrangements  as a share of total revenue.
20(environmental management) certification.  An important factor in the decision to  obtain quality
licenses was the pressure from foreign partners.  Several managers  pursued such policy independently
since  they wanted  to establish  their own trademark  products on foreign  markets.
VI. Performance Measures
To measure the extent of enterprise restructuring, we focus on labor productivity,  average
operating profitability and total factor productivity  (TFP) growth.  All three measures are important
indicators  of enterprise  restructuring,  but to different degrees  depending  on the stages of reform. Taken
together, they present  a fairly complete  picture of the restructuring  process. The three measures  rely on
basic data (revenues  and expenses)  and should not be greatly affected by the still-evolving  accounting
practices  in Slovakia.
Labor productivity  (defined as value added per employee  in constant 1996 prices) is a useful
measure  of restructuring  in the early stages of enterprise  adjustment.  Labor productivity  is regarded  as a
leading  indicator  of restructuring  (Wolff, 1996)  since wage and labor adjustment  measures  can be taken
more  rapidly  than modernizing  the capital  stock, entering  new markets,  etc.
We  next measure the  extent  of  restructuring by  examining firms'  average operating
profitability  over time.  Changes in operating profitability (defined here as [total revenues - wages -
material inputs] \ total revenues) reflect a large number of restructuring measures: labor and wage
rationalization,  adjustment  of input use to reflect new relative prices, better output quality and higher
sales revenues, and the movement of resources toward higher-productivity  firms and sectors.  In
measuring  these changes, we use operating profitability rather than net profitability.  The difference
between  operating  and net profitability  is in (not) accounting  for  interest and other financial  charges;  and
depreciation. Given the often arbitrary allocation of liabilities  under central-planning,  the inclusion  of
these variables  could  introduce  unnecessary  noise in measuring  enterprise  restructuring.
21Finally, we calculate  total factor productivity (TFP) growth, which measures changes in a
firm's efficiency  in using inputs (factors  of production):  labor,  materials,  and capital. TFP growth is the
standard measure of productivity  and has been widely used in empirical studies of industrialized  and
semi-industrialized  countries. We describe  the estimation  procedure  in the Appendix.
The results (Table 5) show a significant  improvement  over time with average labor productivity
nearly doubling  by  1996. Average  annual  TFP growth is also high -- 3.3%. Operating  profitability  also
improved  but with a lag - a measurable  improvement  was seen only in 1996. The results show that the
majority  of large firms (including  some of the largest loss-makers  in Slovak manufacturing)  restructured
successfully in the absence of foreign investors and government-led  restructuring programs.  This
outcome  is encouraging  for other transition  economies  which (like Slovakia)  haven't attracted significant
foreign  investment  and whose  governments  cannot afford large-scale  enterprise  restructuring  programs.
The average performance  indicators  hide, however,  a heterogeneous  performance.  A quarter of
all firms remain plagued by serious problems at the end of the sample period.  What explains their
difficulties? Initial conditions  play a big role. Five of the seven firms rated"non-viable  loss-makers"  in
1993 still performed  poorly in 1996. Sector  origin is also important. Firms in heavy machine  industries
(particularly  in military equipment  production)  performed  badly throughout  the period. Even within the
machinery  sector, however, firm performance  was far from homogeneous. Three firms in the sample -
all producers of military trucks -- saw changes in labor productivity of -58%,  +24%, and  +226%
respectively.
As half of the privatization  deals were concluded  in the 1995-96  period, the sample  did not
allow  us to rigorously  test the hypothesis  that privatization  explained  differences  in firm performance.
Three developments,  however, were already visible. First,  privatization  ended the
22Table 5: Firm Restructuring Indicators
Operating  Profitability  Labor  Productivity  Index  Annual
Case  Type  Sector  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  TF`P**
Growth
I  NL  car components  -7.13  -12.50  -7.23  -16.18  -20.24  -3.81  100  73  96  78  97  168  1.8%
2  VP  paints  7.78  10.26  11.84  7.84  4.57  8.43  100  118  122  155  286  321  6.3%
3  NL  electrical  engines  -15.20  -14.55  -21.58  -29.38  -23.00  -13.75  100  92  93  99  81  96  0.8%
4  VL  steel tire cords  2.99  4.44  4.89  5.82  5.32  6.12  100  101  78  109  133  166  4.7%
5  NL  military trucks  7.87  2.88  -57.33  -43.11  -15.38  -2.87  100  34  62  55  88  124  1.2%
6  NL  skid  steer loaders  8.70  -0.83  -3.60  -39.88  -36.62  0.32  100  88  73  55  70  147  4.4%
7  VL  rubber and  fertilizers  3.89  3.37  -1.02  0.32  1.43  -13.26  100  96  82  135  179  194  3.2%
8  VL  steel;  cement  -0.03  -0.02  0.04  0.17  0.13  0.20  100  54  63  145  176  204  1.1%
9  NL  army  uniforms  8.33  6.62  -3.65  -4.96  -16.67  -20.83  100  129  100  96  77  98  -0.4%
10  VL  rubber  floors  -6.82  -4.47  -8.06  -1.54  3.00  6.16  100  101  115  149  230  310  6.4%
11  VL  overheadprojectors  9.86  7.69  2.84  1.85  -15.52  3.28  100  91  86  104  113  133  2.3%
12  VL  breadandpastries  5.06  1.52  0.99  -7.14  0.81  2.16  100  82  68  74  101  126  1.6%
13  VL  rolling bearings  1.48  -1.24  -0.41  0.61  0.49  0.72  100  75  93  144  219  259  1.7%
14  VL  industrial chemicals  1.73  1.52  1.49  1.51  0.86  1.41  100  45  43  51  84  104  1.2%
15  VP  glassfiber  felts and fabrics  1.05  0.94  1.40  1.57  1.65  2.01  100  106  138  167  213  271  6.8%
16  VL  technical glass  3.50  2.21  0.85  5.12  4.81  3.53  100  120  144  208  261  278  3.5%
17  VP  petrochemicals  3.96  7.26  10.00  9.52  9.94  11.14  100  87  122  191  181  210  4.3%
18  NL  military trucks  -0.91  -9.06  -14.93  -13.79  -2.90  10.84  100  74  38  64  216  326  4.4%
19  VL  freight wagons  0.84  1.95  5.03  0.90  1.77  2.50  100  74  58  107  146  154  3.6%
20  VL  paper and cellulose  0.35  -1.71  -1.21  3.10  6.62  7.29  100  89  89  133  191  227  2.3%
21  NL  military  trucks  3.25  1.96  -20.75  -42.73  -39.00  -21.33  100  95  24  39  34  42  -0.4%
Average  manufacturing  1.93  0.39  -4.78  -7.64  -6.08  -0.46  100  90  88  115  155  193**  3.3%
*  This corresponds  to an average  annual  growth of 14%. ** See Appendix  for a description  of the estimation. We use firm-specific  price indices  as reported  by managers.
23high management  turnover that some firms experienced  in the 1991-94  period.  Second, privatization
resulted in  contracts with foreign partners who were previously afraid of the lack of  long-term
commitment. Third, the firms which were privatized early invested more than state-owned firms
(Table  4).
The relative success  of the firms initially classified  as non-viable  also gives a fuirther  indication
of the positive role of privatization.  The only two NL firms (cases 1 and 18) which restructured
significantly  were privatized  in 1992.  Among  the other five NL firms three were privatized in 1995-
96, and two are still in state hands.  The analysis  in Table 5 shows  a rapidly diverging  performance  as
the firms privatized  early consistently  improved  productivity  and profitability  while the state owned and
late-privatized  firms' performance deteriorated.  This pattern should, however, be interpreted with
caution.  The two successful  firms may have been privatized early because the new owners saw their
potential  for improvement. This holds in particular for firm 18, which was privatized  through a direct
sale. Since  firm 1 went through the mass privatization,  such a bias is unlikely.
Finally, a  large part of the unexplained variation may be  due to  managerial ability and
motivation. While the analysis  in the preceding section  showed  few differences  in age and backgrounds
among firm managers, other characteristics  likely matter too. Documenting  such characteristics  is not
the primary focus of this work, and we leave it for future research.
VII.  Conclusions
This paper documents  the ownership changes and restructuring actions taken by a sample of
large Slovak firms during the transition to  a  market economy.  There is substantial evidence of
improved performance  in three-quarters  of all cases.  A quarter of firms still face difficulties. The
variations  in firm performance  can mainly be attributed  to different initial  conditions,  sector origin, and
managerial  ability  in restructuring.
24The reading of these cases brings a better  understanding  of the determinants  of restructuring.
It suggests  the differences  among  privatization  methods  in enhancing  firm restructuring  are smaller  than
previously  hypothesized. The study also shows  that most managers  led heroic restructuring  efforts with
no outside  help, be it in the form of foreign investors or government  programs.  These findings  are of
course tentative  and should  be tested on larger panels  of data in a cross-section  of transition  economies.
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27Appendix
Total  factor productivity (TFP) growth has  been widely used  in  empirical studies of
industrialized  and semi-industrialized  countries. It has received less attention in transition economies,
based on the belief that the book  value of fixed assets is inaccurate  and introduces  significant  noise in any
estimation. We avoid this problem by using energy consumption  as a proxy for capital utilization. 11
This correction  has many desirable properties. Most importantly,  in the transition context, it is a flow
measure  and does  not depend  on accounting  measures  of fixed assets. It is also a good measure  of capital
services  and is less volatile  over time when compared  to the standard  capital  stock measure.
TFP growth  is estimated  using a production  function  of the form
0  1
AY  = ai  +  att[  aAMt  +f  AL.  +(v+  ) AE.]+£i
where AYi,t (In Yi,t - In Y i,t-  1) is the log-difference  in total revenues,  AMi,t is the log-difference  in
material inputs,  ALi,t  is the log-difference  in number  of hours worked, and AEi,t  is the log-difference  in
energy usage;  ai  is the share of  material input expenditures in total expenditure  averaged over the
sample period, Pi, yi , and p i are the average shares of wages, energy,  and capital maintenance  in total
expenditures  respectively.
We  rely only  on flow  variables (investment plus  maintenance and  repairs costs minus
depreciation)  in calculating q i . The specification  has two additional  characteristics. The calculation  of
factor weights as average shares of total costs allows for non-zero pure profits (and thus imperfect
competition). Since the al  i,t  coefficient is estimated directly it does not impose the assumption  of
constant  returns  to scale. The relaxation  of these  two assumptions  is important  for Slovak  firms since (as
noted in Section IV) some may still enjoy substantial market power while others have returns-to-scale
reduced  by the drastic decline  in demand.
We next calculate TFP growth as the sum of the firm's fixed effect (aO ) and the regression
residual  (s). In particular,
Ati  =ai+£
TEP growth can be calculated  between  two consecutive  years, as well as over longer periods. Year-to-
year differences  give us a better idea of the evolution of productivity  growth.  Beginning-to-end-period
differences  typically smoothe  some of the changes  and give a more consistent  picture of average firm
performance. We have used the latter approach  for the 1991-96  period and imputed  the average annual
TFP  change  reported  in Table 3.
An  alternative  approach  is  to correct  for  missing  capital  stock  numbers  and  make  inflation  adjustments.  It
does  not,  however,  address  the  fundamental  question  whether  capital  stock  is  the  most appropriate  proxy  for
capital  utilization.
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